UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

3-20-2015

Johnson v. State Respondent's Brief 2 Dckt. 41414

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Johnson v. State Respondent's Brief 2 Dckt. 41414" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 4979.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/4979

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAt 1u
ROBERT TERRY JOHNSON,

Petitioner-Appel Iant,

)
)

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

No. 41414

)

)
)
)
)
)

vs.

COPY

Gooding Co. Case No.
CV-2013-84

)

_____________ )
REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF GOODING

HONORABLE JOHN K. BUTLER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

ROBYN FYFFE
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay &
Bartlett, LLP
PO Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................. ii
ARGUMENT IN REPLY ................................................................................... 1
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court
Erred In Summarily Dismissing His Second Successive
Post-Conviction Petition ........................................................................ 1
A.

lntroduction ................................................................................. 1

B.

Johnson's Argument On Appeal Is Precluded By
Murphy v. State ........................................................................... 2

C.

In The Alternative, Even Notwithstanding Murphy,
Johnson's Assertion That His Initial Successive Petition
Was Timely Is Barred By The Doctrine of Res Judicata ............. 5
1.

The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Precludes
Johnson's Timeliness Argument. ....................................... 6

2.

Johnson's Initial Successive Petition Was Untimely .......... ?

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 10
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................... 10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 174 P.3d 870 (2007) .................................. 7
Evensiosky v. State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001) ..................................... 7
Johnson v. State, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 574,
Docket No. 37378 (Idaho App., August 8, 2011) ........................................... 5
Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 219 P.3d 1204 (Ct. App. 2009) ........................... 7
Lopez v. State, 157 Idaho 795, 339 P.3d 1199 (Ct. App. 2014) .................... 1, 2, 4
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365 (2014) ................................. 1, 2, 4
Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518, 337 P.3d 677 (Ct. App. 2014) .......................... 1, 4
Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 202 P.3d 642 (2008) .......................................... 8
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066 (2009) ..................................... 7
State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 919 P.2d 333 ( 1996) ......................................... 3

STATUTES
I.C. § 19-4902 ...................................................................................................... 7
I.C. § 19-4908 .................................................................................................. 4, 5

ii

ARGUMENT IN REPLY
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred In Summarily
Dismissing His Second Successive Post-Conviction Petition

A.

Introduction
Johnson contends that the district court erred by summarily dismissing his

second successive post-conviction petition.

(See generally Appellant's brief;

Reply Brief.) In his Appellant's brief, Johnson argued that egregious deficiency of
his initial post-conviction petition counsel constituted "sufficient reason" pursuant
to I.C. § 19-4908 to justify the filing of a second successive petition. After the
Idaho Court of Appeals subsequently undermined this argument in Lopez v.
State, 157 Idaho 795, 339 P.3d 1199 (Ct. App. 2014), Johnson argued in his
Reply brief that his second successive petition was justified by the efforts he
made to attempt to mitigate his counsel's deficient performance. (See generally
Reply brief.) The Idaho Court of Appeals permitted the state to file this brief in
response. 1 (2/9/15 Order.)

Despite Johnson's attempts to re-characterize his

argument, he has still failed to distinguish Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 327
P.3d 365 (2014).

Johnson filed a motion to augment his Appellant's brief with new arguments
made in his Reply brief regarding the Idaho Court of Appeals' recent opinions in
Lopez and Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho 518, _ , 337 P.3d 677, 681 (Ct. App.
2014). (2/4/15 "Motion to Augment Appellant's Brief.") The Idaho Court of
Appeals granted the motion with respect to "all arguments set forth in Appellant's
reply brief," and permitted the state to file a brief in response. (2/9/15 Order.)
1

1

B.

Johnson's Argument On Appeal Is Precluded By Murphy v. State
In Murphy v. State, the Idaho Supreme Court overruled prior precedent

and held that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel cannot constitute
"sufficient reason" for filing a successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.
Murphy, 156 Idaho at 392-395, 327 P.3d at 368-371. The Court recognized that
because, as the United States Supreme Court has recognized, there is no
constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, a
petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel in such
proceedings, even as a means of attempting to overcome state procedural
hurdles.

kt

In this case, Johnson attempted to distinguish Murphy by arguing that it
does not apply where a post-conviction petitioner demonstrates particularly
egregious

counsel

ineffectiveness

assistance of counsel."

that

goes

"beyond

(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.)

simple

ineffective

However, in the interim

between the filing of Johnson's Appellant's brief and the state's Respondent's
brief, the Idaho Court of Appeals rejected a nearly identical argument in Lopez v.
State, 157 Idaho at_, 339 P.3d at 1201-1202. In its Respondent's brief, the
state argued that Lopez precluded Johnson's attempt to distinguish Murphy.
(Respondent's brief, pp.10-11.)
In his Reply Brief, Johnson attempted to distinguish Lopez and Murphy by
arguing that his second successive post-conviction petition was justified by the
efforts he made to attempt to mitigate his initial successive petition counsel's
ineffectiveness.

(See generally Reply brief.)
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More specifically, Johnson

contends that the "focus" of his justification for the filing of the second successive
petition "is on [his own] efforts, not his attorney's performance." (Reply brief,
p.1.) Johnson argues that when he realized his initial successive post-conviction
counsel was failing to adequately argue that his petition was timely, he filed
numerous pro se motions in an effort to mitigate this alleged deficient
performance, including a "Motion to Withdraw Counsel" and a "Motion to Conduct
Discovery." (Reply brief, pp.2-3.) The district court apparently did not rule on
these motions prior to summarily dismissing Johnson's petition. See Idaho Data
Repository, Gooding County Case No. CV-2009-00399; R., Vol. I, pp.192-215,
226.) Johnson contends that "[e]quity demands that such personal attempts to
correct counsel's actions before the action is dismissed and which are ignored by
the district court be deemed sufficient to present the claims in a successive
action."2 (Reply brief, pp.2-3.)
Johnson has failed to distinguish Murphy or Lopez. Despite his attempt to
re-characterize his proposed justification for filing a second successive petition,
Johnson's argument is still, at its core, that ineffective assistance of his initial
post-conviction counsel constitutes "sufficient reason" to justify a second
successive petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Johnson's argument that he tried

While the Idaho Data Repository indicates that these motions were filed on
December 23, 2009, the motions themselves do not appear to be included in the
appellate record. In his reply brief, Johnson cites to the Data Repository when
referencing these motions. (See Reply brief, p.2.) Thus, it is impossible to
analyze the effort Johnson actually made to mitigate any alleged deficiency of
counsel, or even to confirm that these motions were what the Data Repository
purported them to be. Missing portions of the record must be presumed to
support the action of the district court. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919
P.2d 333, 334 (1996).
2

3

to bring his counsel's deficient performance to the attention of his counsel and
the district court does not change the character of this proposed justification.
Neither the language of Murphy, nor the language of the cases which have
interpreted Murphy, is so narrow as to exclude instances where a post-conviction
petitioner demonstrates his efforts to mitigate the alleged deficiency.

See

Murphy, 156 Idaho 389, 327 P.3d 365; Lopez, 157 Idaho 795, 339 P.3d 1199;
Parvin, 157 Idaho 518, 337 P.3d 677, 681.

Indeed, such a limitation on the

holding of Murphy would largely abrogate it.

It is common for ineffective

assistance of counsel claims to include, as evidence of counsel's deficiency,
allegations regarding what steps a petitioner took in his unsuccessful attempts to
encourage counsel to take some action. Such allegations do not transform an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim to a different type of claim outside of the
purview of Murphy.

Johnson has therefore failed to distinguish Murphy, and

failed to demonstrate that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
second successive petition.
Johnson's Reply Brief may also be construed as arguing that the district
court erred by failing to rule on his prose motions filed in the course of the initial
successive post-conviction proceeding, and that this error constitutes "sufficient
reason" to file another successive petition. (See Reply Brief, pp.1-4.) However
this assertion, even if true, does not form a basis for justifying a successive
petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908. Idaho Code§ 19-4908 permits a petitioner to
file a successive petition when there is "sufficient reason" to justify a new ground
or claim.

It does not permit a petitioner to utilize a successive petition as a

4

mechanism to correct alleged procedural errors made by the district court in a
prior post-conviction proceeding. 3
The Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Murphy precludes the argument on
which Johnson's appeal relies - that ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel can constitute sufficient reason to justify the filing of a successive
petition pursuant to I.C. § 19-4908.

Johnson therefore cannot show that the

district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition.

C.

In The Alternative, Even Notwithstanding Murphy, Johnson's Assertion
That His Initial Successive Petition Was Timely Is Barred By The Doctrine
of Res Judicata
The district court summarily dismissed Johnson's initial successive petition

both on its merits, and on the ground that it was untimely. (R. Vol. I, pp.192215.) The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the summary dismissal solely on the
timeliness ground. Johnson v. State, 2011 Unpublished Opinion No. 574, Docket
No. 37378 (Idaho App., August 8, 2011 ).
second

successive post-conviction

In conjunction with the filing of his

petition,

Johnson submitted additional

affidavits, evidence, and arguments regarding his efforts to timely file the first
successive petition. (R., Vol. I, pp.5-163, 166.) After providing notice, the district
court summarily dismissed the petition, correctly concluding that Johnson's
timeliness argument was barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and that in any

3

Similarly, and as the state previously argued (Respondent's brief, pp.12-13), no
application of Murphy is necessary in this case because while I.C. § 19-4908
permits a petitioner to file a successive petition where there is "sufficient reason"
to justify a new ground or claim, it does not permit a petitioner to re-litigate prior
determinations, such as the ones made in this case by the district court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals, that his initial successive petition was untimely.
5

event, Johnson's initial successive petition was untimely even in light of the
additional argument and evidence. (R., Vol. I, pp.164-181; Vol. II, pp.283-298.)
Johnson has failed to show that the district court erred as to either of these
determinations.
1.

The Doctrine Of Res Judicata Precludes Johnson's Timeliness
Argument

In his Reply brief, Johnson asserts that the district court erred by
concluding that his timeliness argument is precluded by the res judicata doctrine.
(Reply brief, pp.6-7.)

Specifically, Johnson asserts: "The question now before

the Court is whether the additional information, which Mr. Johnson was
prevented from presenting due to the district court's failure to acknowledge his
pro se motions to excuse his counsel, establishes that Mr. Johnson filed within a
reasonable time. This issue was not addressed in the prior proceedings and its
consideration is not precluded by res judicata or the law of the case." (Reply
brief, p.7.)
Johnson's contention fails because he has not cited authority to support
his apparent proposition that an individual can avoid res judicata issue preclusion
simply by presenting new arguments based on previously known evidence, or by
asserting that previous attempts to pursue the issue were thwarted by ineffective
assistance of counsel or court error. Under Johnson's interpretation of the res

judicata doctrine, no Idaho appellate decision would be safe from continuous
attacks in the district court, supported by new arguments and second-guessing of
prior attorney performance.

The Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the district

6

court's determination that Johnson's initial successive petition was untimely.
Johnson may not re-litigate this issue.
2.

Johnson's Initial Successive Petition Was Untimely

A post-conviction proceeding must be commenced by filing a petition "any
time within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the
determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an
appeal, whichever is later."

I.C. § 19-4902(a).

In the case of successive

petitions, the Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that rigid application of I.C. §
19-4902 would preclude courts from considering 'claims which simply are not
known to the defendant within the time limit, yet raise important due process
issues."' Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009)
(quoting Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)).
Thus, previously unknown claims are not time-barred if brought within a
reasonable time of when they were known or should have been known.
Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 251, 220 P.3d at 1070.

Moreover, the timeliness of a

petition is measured "from the date of notice, not from the date a petitioner
assembles a complete cache of evidence." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174
P.3d at 875. Absent a showing by the petitioner that the limitation period should
be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for post-conviction relief is a basis for
dismissal of the petition. Rhoades, 148 Idaho 247, 220 P.3d 1066; Evensiosky v.
State, 136 Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Kriebel v. State, 148 Idaho 188, 190,
219 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ct. App. 2009).
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In this case, even if neither Murphy, I.C. § 19-4908, or the res judicata
doctrine precludes Johnson's argument on appeal, he has still failed to show that
the district court erred in concluding that his initial successive petition was
untimely, even in light of his new arguments and newly submitted evidence.
In his Reply brief, Johnson contends that the district court failed to
properly apply the Charboneau "reasonable time" standard for successive
petitions, and instead incorrectly applied the 42-day standard utilized to evaluate
the timeliness of successive petitions filed in capital cases. (Appellant's brief, p.5
(citing Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727, 202 P.3d 642, 649 (2008)).
However, a review of the record reveals that while the district court cited Pizzuto
and referenced the 42-day capital case successive petition standard, it did not
directly apply it, and instead recognized and utilized the Charboneau "reasonable
time" standard.
In both its notice of intent to dismiss Johnson's successive petition and its
memorandum dismissal order, the district court cited the applicable Charboneau
standard and specifically recognized that "[t]he evaluation of timeliness [of a
successive] petition has always been on a case by case basis," and that such an
evaluation includes an analysis of "the reasonable time necessary to prepare and
file a petition for post-conviction relief," the mental capacity of the petitioner, and
the petitioner's familiarity with the post-conviction proceeding process. (R., Vol. I,
p.175.) The court then engaged in a thorough analysis of Johnson's arguments
regarding the timeliness of his petition, and of the efforts Johnson made to

8

pursue possible remedies upon receiving notice of the basis for his new postconviction claim. (R., Vol. I, pp.164-181; Vol. II, pp.288-295.)
No such analysis would be necessary had the court directly applied the
42-day Pizzuto standard from the date on which Johnson received notice of the
basis for the new claim. Instead, the analysis demonstrates that the district court
considered the timeliness issue in the "case-by-case" manner contemplated by
Charboneau, according to the specific facts of this case.

The court then

continued, "[i]f forty-two days is a reasonable time to file a successive petition in
a capital case there is no reason to believe that such a time period would not be
reasonable in a non-capital case." (R., Vol. II, p.296.) Johnson has failed to
show that the district court's reference to the 42-day Pizzuto standard as a mere
guideline constitutes an incorrect application of the Charboneau "reasonable
time" standard.

This is particularly true where, as in this case, the actual time

between the notice of the basis of the claim and the filing of the petition - four
months - significantly exceeds 42 days.

Johnson has therefore failed to show

that the district court erred. 4
Even if neither Murphy nor I.C. § 19-4908 precluded Johnson's asserted
justification for the filing of a second successive post-conviction petition, Johnson
has failed to show that the district court erred either by concluding that Johnson's
timeliness argument was barred by the res judicata doctrine, or by concluding

The state also asserts that Johnson has failed to demonstrate that the district
court erred in concluding that four months exceeded the Charboneau
"reasonable time" standard in which to file a successive petition under the
specific circumstances of this case. For this proposition, the state adopts the
district court's rationale, as stated in its Notice of Intent to Dismiss and
Memorandum Decision. (R., Vol. I, pp.164-181, Vol. II, pp.283-298.)
4

9

that Johnson's initial successive petition was not filed within a reasonable time of
Johnson receiving notice of the factual basis for the claim.

Johnson has

therefore failed to show that the district court erred in summarily dismissing his
petition.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's
summary dismissal of Johnson's second successive petition for post-conviction
relief.
DATED this 20th day of March 2015

~

c~

MARKW. OLSO
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 20th day of March, 2015, I caused a true
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, MCKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 West Bannock
P. 0. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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